In this paper I would like to make the bold suggestion that, more than any other intellectual, the philosopher of religion John Watson (1847-1939) is responsible for the high value Canadians place upon unity-in-diversity in culture and politics. This suggestion is bold for several reasons, among which is the fact that I am not first a student of Canadian history, but rather a philosopher of religion. It is meant to stimulate discussion and encourage others to examine the development of a philosophical ideology in John Watson’s time and in the era following.

It is not difficult to establish that, at least publicly, Canadians place a higher value on unity-(or identity)-in-diversity than our neighbours to the south: the metaphors of mosaic and melting pot have been used to characterize the difference. So we have books like Canada: Unity in Diversity, A Quest For Identity, Conflict and Unity: An Introduction to Canadian Political Life, The Canadian Alternative: Cultural Pluralism and Canadian Unity, and Baptists in Canada: Search for Identity Amidst Diversity. There are a number of institutions and book titles which weight the opposition of unity and diversity on the side of identity or unity, to correct the implied imbalance towards diversity or division: among the former are The Council for Canadian Unity, and The Task Force on Canadian Unity, and among the latter are The Canadian Identity by W.L. Morton, A Passion for Identity: Introduction to Canadian Studies, In Search of a Canadian Identity, The Search for Identity, The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967, Theme: Curriculum for a Canadian Identity, and Our Sense of Identity.
The title of Marilyn Legge’s recent book, *The Grace of Difference: Canadian Radical Christianity*, may likewise assume the existence and value of unity as an implied contrary. We even have a history of a doctor’s association which is oriented to the unity-diversity issue: David Shephard’s *The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, 1960-1980: The Pursuit of Unity*. It can be said that unity-in-diversity was the central theme of John Watson’s thought. Perhaps most of us here have heard of John Watson; a generation or two ago his reputation was much greater. In the middle of this century John Irving described Watson’s appointment to Queen’s University in 1872 as “the most important event in Canadian philosophy in the nineteenth century.” He also wrote, “One of the four great teachers of philosophy (in the opinion of many the greatest) in Canada during the last hundred years, Watson was the first philosopher in this country to achieve an international reputation through his writings.” “Even a brief sketch of his writings must indicate that if any Canadian philosopher of the nineteenth century is remembered in future ages, it will surely be John Watson.” W.L. Morton wrote of the 1920s that “[i]n professional philosophy the speculative idealism of the great John Watson of Queen’s University still remained the chief philosophic influence in Canada, and particularly in theology and the life of the Church.” At least until 1965 Watson was the only Canadian to have delivered the Gifford Lectures (in 1910-12). More recently A.B. McKillop has noted that Watson led the “Kantian Revival” in the 1880s in the English-speaking world.

Watson wrote prolifically, producing fifteen major works and more than sixty articles and book reviews. His chief constructive work in philosophy is in the area of philosophy of religion: besides his *Interpretation of Religious Experience*, there is the relatively brief *Christianity and Idealism*, and *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*.

There is good reason to think that John Watson’s thought was broadly influential in Canada, if only because of the exposure of Watson to generations of students. Queen’s was small when Watson came in 1872: besides the Principal and six teachers, there were thirty students in Arts and another twenty students in Theology. It was also small intellectually: when he came, Watson learned that the students were barred from reading Darwin’s *Origin of Species* (1859). By the time he retired in 1924 hundreds of Protestant clergy, educators, civil servants and others had passed through the doors of Queen’s, both in the regular undergraduate and theo-
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logical programs and in the ten-day annual Theological Alumni Conferences (begun in 1893). W.E. McNeill, a student of Watson’s and later Vice-Principal of Queen’s, observed that “the whole University knew that minds were transformed” in Watson’s classes.

But were minds really transformed in Watson’s classes? To answer this question, we must consider the impact of Watson’s teachings on the students and the broader academic community. A. B. McKillop argues that Watson was instrumental in the transition of the overtly Christian mental and moral philosophy of the nineteenth century into a broadly secular moral outlook that has dominated much of English-Canadian thought. The “deeply ironic legacy” of the idealists for Protestantism in Canada was the transformation of the faith into a secular message of social service with indefinite “spiritual” significance. McKillop suggests that the quality of thinking in the community must have been to some degree affected by Watson’s auspicious reconciliation of the apparently divergent teachings of science, philosophy, and religion.

Marguerite Van Die claims (contra A. B. McKillop) that idealism did not change in the classroom. But was Watson’s influence really deep? So Watson had a broad influence. Minds may or may not have been changed in his classes. But was Watson’s influence really deep?

Ramsay Cook’s interpretation is very similar.
influence Presbyterians and Methodists equally. She concludes from a
study of the student newspaper at Victoria College, University of Toronto,
*Acta Victoriana*, that “what may appear [to McKillop] to be idealism can
just as easily be an expression of late nineteenth-century postmillennialism
and a modified form of Christian perfectionism.” McKillop himself ap-
ppears to qualify his view of Watson’s influence, suggesting that it may
have been philosophically indefinite yet widespread. In his discussion of
idealism he says that those who were not philosophically astute would
likely have adopted a vague Hegelianism from Watson as a way beyond
the conflict of religion and science, faith and reason.

I will now describe briefly Watson’s thought and the obscurity of his
Hegelian method. Then I will show how Watson was misunderstood by
one of his students. Finally, I will ask whether we can say that John
Watson had a shallow influence in philosophy but a profound influence on
the Canadian ethos, specifically in the high value Canadians place upon
unity-(or identity)-in-diversity.

Watson’s thought is not easy to follow. Leslie Armour and Elizabeth
Trott observe that Watson’s form of idealism “is complex and does not
yield at once to immediate surface analyses.” This is the case because
Watson does not tell his readers that he is following Hegel’s method.
However, there is no question that his method and assumptions are
Hegelian. He writes,

\[
\ldots \text{Hegel... found within the sphere of experience a number of}
\text{phases, all of which are equally real, though none is a complete and}
\text{adequate manifestation of the absolute except the most concrete of all.}
\text{Hegel, therefore, sought in the idea of a spiritual Unity, i.e., a Unity}
\text{which is essentially self-manifesting and self-knowing, for the true}
\text{principle which should explain life, art, and religion.}\]

Watson presents the development of everything religious or philosophical
in terms of the emergence of contradiction and the achievement of
(temporary) reconciliation familiar to us as the thesis-antithesis-synthesis
dialectic.

The principle of thought, if we are to express it generally, is neither
identity nor difference, but identity-in-difference. This, in fact, is
merely to say that intelligence is a process in which separate con-
ceptions, which are contradictory of each other, are both held at once. Nor is this merely accidental; for there is no way in which intelligence can reach an all-reconciling conception except through the long and toilsome “labour of the negative,” i.e., by first setting up what seem to be adequate conceptions, next awakening to the consciousness of their inadequacy, and then advancing to a more adequate conception.31

Watson shows the contradictions in Humean empiricism and the resulting sublation in Kant’s idealism, and then he shows the contradictions in Kantian thought which are sublated by the Hegelian philosophy. In religion this development begins with animism and totemism and proceeds through the monotheism of Jewish and Greco-Roman religion, to Jesus’ consciousness of the fundamental identity of God and humankind. The truth that Jesus taught in nuce is obscured by Greek theological ideas, so that the history of religion becomes the (dialectical) development of a proper understanding of God and of the divine-human relation, traceable from Augustine through to Kant. Since Watson’s God is the self-existent, self-objectifying, and self-knowing deity of Hegelianism, he is able to address the empiricism and agnosticism of his day with confidence.

In reality, however, Watson’s philosophy is ambiguous, and this ambiguity is the ambiguity of the Hegelian system. The Hegelian Aufhebung or sublation is supposedly a movement beyond simple opposition which both leaves the opposed elements behind or overcomes them, and takes them up in a higher synthesis. The “taking up” of thesis and antithesis only alternates conceptually with their overcoming. This sublation simply doesn’t work: rather, the contradiction re-surfaces conceptually in ambiguity. (Incidentally, the source of this ambiguity, behind Hegel, is Spinoza’s self-contradictory notion of the totality, which is both everything there is without remainder, and a self-transcending whole which is “greater than the sum of its parts.”32)

I will not expand on the fine points of Hegelian philosophy here. I will note, however, that Watson followed Hegel in his insistence that the totality, the Absolute, is not known except in its parts, its movements or moments, the historical and spiritual determinations and dialectic of which it is composed. The practical result of this was that Watson’s students had to follow his dialectical treatment of history (the history of philosophy or the history of religion) without a road map. Watson would simply take
each moment (a philosophical position, a religious movement) and tease out its contradiction. Then he would show that these contradictions were overcome in the next moment of the dialectic. As far as I can see, he directed his student’s attention to this demonstration of the dialectic in history, and seldom to the Hegelian method itself. Watson might have told them this: if you find a unity, look for diversity or contradiction within it; if you find diversity, look for the underlying unity. For, in simple terms, this was Watson’s omnicompetent method.

In my somewhat cursory research in the *Queen’s Quarterly* and the *Queen’s College Journal* I found some slight evidence of Watson’s influence. One article stood out: in “Does Historical Criticism Do Violence to Special Revelation?”, J.A. Sinclair’s explicit intention is to reconcile in good Watsonian fashion the notion of a revelation from beyond the immanent world and its wisdom, and the work of biblical criticism which brings such a notion into question. In fact, however, he uses Watson’s thought to counter a high view of scriptural authority, a view which is never explicitly stated. To do this he makes use of the principle of the necessary unity of subject and object in the knowing relation. “[T]here is one necessary condition to which Special Revelation must conform in order to be a Revelation for us. That condition is, that Special Revelation must not make an absolute break in the unity of the consciousness to which it is given.” The author is handling Watson’s principles, but without Watson’s reasons or powers of reasoning: Watson himself would attempt to show that special revelation is merely the making explicit of natural knowledge which was implicit. The author of this article claims that the alternative to his condition is that the supernatural would be separated from the natural and the Divine Mind would act upon the human being only in his or her “non-rational states.” Here again is the immanentism and the insistence upon the rationality of the real which goes back to Hegel. Further, Sinclair writes that “[i]nspiration must not so destroy the unity of consciousness, underlying separateness of personality among men, as to destroy that communication of mind with mind by which we are able to learn from one another.” He continues by claiming that, as the identity (or unity) of the subject means the continuity of experience, without contradictions, so Special Revelation cannot contain explicit contradictions in itself, or in relation to ordinary consciousness.

Sinclair’s assumptions about the rationality of “revelation” and of the unity of consciousness are Watson’s own, though the argument itself
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is quite inferior to those of Watson. Though he follows Watson faithfully when he says that knowledge is the process of removing by thought the (apparent) contradictions of experience, he does not seem to see the significance of this for his own method. Borrowing again from Watson’s philosophy, Sinclair thinks that the trustworthiness of Scripture lies not in the inscrutability of its origin, but in “its transcendental power of meeting the truest need of its time,” or an accommodation to changing needs and circumstances. Thus it must be read “in the light of the different phases of human development.”

One can see throughout Sinclair’s presentation the adoption of Watson’s line of thought (most probably from Watson himself) without a true grasp of it. Watson’s conclusions, which have their origin in an argument concerning the necessary conditions of knowing, are turned into dogmatic principles. So, for example, Watson would dispense with the fear that God might act upon the human being in his or her “non-rational states” by denying that the non-rational can ever be a “state” of the human being. Watson’s hostility to the irrational (or anti-rational) is indicated by his criticisms of Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought: Nietzsche’s enthusiasm is “crack-brained,” his metaphysics “crude and one-sided,” his doctrine “preposterous,” and so forth. “Reason is the comprehensive intelligence, and if we can’t base religion upon it, religion must go.” Similarly, to say that inspiration must not destroy the unity of consciousness that underlies the separateness of personality among men would be, from Watson’s viewpoint, a confusion of thought. To begin with, Watson would not admit the possibility of an “inspiration” which might impinge from outside upon the unity of consciousness.

In light of Sinclair’s failure to understand Watson’s method, and his reduction of Watson’s thought to a series of disconnected principles, one wonders how many others in pulpit, classroom, or journal did the same thing with what they learned from Watson. It is certainly reasonable to assume that if Watson’s phrases and notions are found in the writings or speeches of those who worked with him, he has had some influence upon them. So Watson’s peer O.D. Skelton, Professor of Political Science at Queen’s, held to the ideal of “unity in difference” though he was not an idealist per se. For example, he concludes by observing that Canada had to offer the world the achievement of “difference in unity,” and that this might “seem an idealistic aim,” but nonetheless one worth following. In his pamphlet The Language Issue in Canada, he argues that French may
be the required language of instruction in Quebec because “[w]e want unity, not a drab, steam-rollered uniformity. The man who forgets the rock out of which he is hewn is no better Canadian for it; to repress old traditions before we have given new ideals is questionable policy.”

Idealism in its moral aspect lies in the background, too, in Skelton’s observations on political leadership in The Day of Sir Wilfred Laurier: “The path followed was not as ruler-straight as the philosopher or the critic would have prescribed. The leader of a party of many shades of opinion, the ruler of a country of widely different interests and prejudices and traditions, must often do not what is ideally best but what is the most practicable approach to the ideal.” As a modern political scientist, Skelton was impressed by empirical difference, and this seems to have directed him away from the containing philosophy of idealism. It should be remembered, however, that Hegelian idealism is empirically-oriented as well. Though the allusion to the unity of the ideal is slight in Skelton’s remark, it appears to form the implicit background to his description.

Watson’s influence is more evident in the early work of Queen’s political scientist Adam Shortt, who had been a gold medallist in philosophy under him. In an article written in 1901, Shortt argues that duty and freedom are one, as “the central feature” in the development of a moral people “is the growing personality, or self, which in its more or less clear consciousness of a rational freedom, spontaneously recognizes its responsibility for conduct.” Immanuel Kant had opposed duty and freedom, but Hegel had “reconciled” them, and Shortt’s words could have been written by Watson himself. Similarly Watsonian is Shortt’s comment that the ordinary individual acts and thinks “uncritically” “upon the principle that the rational is the real.” In an article written a year later, the idealistic influence is reduced to a brief observation in the introduction: though “to the eye of pure reason,” Canada’s chaotic political past “may seem but a poor product for so long and so strenuous an effort, yet it has in it more of stability and promise than might be suspected” by some.

It seems that Skelton and Shortt, and probably many others, were influenced by John Watson’s thought, though in such a way that idealism was reduced to a series of unrelated principles, chief of which was the idea of “unity-in-diversity.” On the one hand, demonstrating that this must be the case is difficult, for Watson was not the only idealist in Canada in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, he was the earliest, and the most influential in terms of academic stature and of the
sheer number of influential people who would have heard him or read his works.

I have suggested that John Watson, more than any other intellectual, is responsible for the importance of unity-(or identity)-in-diversity in the Canadian ethos. What might be argued against this thesis? Perhaps the chief objection is the difficulty of establishing influence: the notion of identity-in-diversity is derived (through Hegel) from the Christian view of the Trinity, and from Christian views of the church, and it might be difficult to distinguish Watson’s philosophical notion from a direct and loose application of Christian views of the church to the larger society. This is essentially Marguerite Van Die’s objection to A.B. McKillop’s reading of Watson’s influence as an idealist.44 As a loose collection of assumptions about the immanence of God in the progress of church, or society, or “the human spirit,” the idealistic philosophy could be found everywhere.45 The superficial appropriation of Watson’s thought by writers like J.A. Sinclair suggests that, though few really understood him, many would have borrowed simple notions such as that of “spirit,” or “the organic nature of society.” What seems to be required at this point is a sustained examination of Watson’s students, who became professors, ministers of the churches, and educators, to see whether they passed on distinct, if disjointed, principles from John Watson’s thought to the next generation of influential Canadians. Chief among these principles would be the unity-(or identity)-in-difference of Watson’s Hegelian idealism.

Endnotes


18. *A Disciplined Intelligence: Critical Inquiry and Canadian Thought in the Victorian Era* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979), 195. Watson’s *Philosophy of Kant as Contained in Extracts of his own Writings* (Glasgow: J. Maclehose and Sons, 1888) was revised and reprinted eleven times between 1888 and 1934. On the subject of Watson’s scholarship on Kant, Irving again remarked that “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that Watson has done more to promote the study of Kant on this continent than any other North American philosopher” (“The Development of Philosophy in Central Canada from 1850 to 1900,” 274). In 1976 the Garland Publishing Company with Lewis White Beck as editor published a series of the eleven most important studies of Kant since that philosopher’s death: two of Watson’s books were among them (McKillop, *Contours of Canadian Thought* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987], 97).


26. According to Cook, Watson brought to Queen’s “a Scottish interpretation of Hegelian idealism that would become a major influence in the development of theological liberalism in Canada.” By the 1890s “theological liberalism” had made its most obvious impact in the Presbyterian Church, “and most markedly in that branch represented and influenced by Queen’s University,” which was under the influence of George Munro Grant, Adam Shortt and John Watson (*The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985], 9). Cook is probably
mistaken to consider Grant and Watson together (Michael Gauvreau, *The Evangelical Century: College and Creed in English Canada from the Great Revival to the Great Depression* [Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991], 155ff).


31. Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy, with Notes Historical and Critical*, 3rd ed. (Glasgow: J. Maclehose and Sons; New York: Macmillan and Co., 1901), 381. (The first edition was published in 1895 under the title *Comte, Mill and Spencer: An Outline of Philosophy*. The editions of 1898 and 1908 were published under the first title.)

32. Wolfhart Pannenberg makes the observation that “the concept of the whole or the totality functions much more in Hegel’s own thought de facto as the category of categories, as the integral of their abstract particularity” (*Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, trans. Philip Clayton [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990], 152).


34. Sinclair, 296.


36. Envelope marked to “Mrs. E.C. Watson, Detroit, Michigan,” dated 1925, Watson Papers, Queen’s University Archives, Box 1.


40. O.D. Skelton’s *Socialism: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1911) does not show any evidence of Watson’s influence, though he summarizes Hegel’s philosophy with competence and presents Marx’s thought in detail (96ff).


43. Adam Shortt, “Responsible government,” *Queen’s Quarterly* 10, No. 3 (1902): 142. The empirical orientation of political science did not encourage extended philosophical interpretations, and Shortt’s other writings from this period sound no idealistic notes.

44. See Michael Gauvreau, 272. Gauvreau claims that William James’ concern for experience ‘spoke, in a way that the abstract idealist philosophy of John Watson could not, to professors and preachers concerned, above all, with the practical task of influencing and transforming the spiritual life of the individual” (273).

45. In *The Regenerators*, Ramsay Cook illustrates the pervasiveness of one or more of these general assumptions not only among conservatives like Albert Carman or “liberal Protestants,” but among contemporary secular humanists (on Carman, see 192; on liberal Protestantism, 184-185; on the “Religion of Humanity,” 61ff).