Re-Conceptualizing Religious Space in the German Democratic Republic: The Role of Protestant Churches in the Formation of a Political Opposition

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The East German Protestant Church was in large part responsible for the remarkable success of the “the peaceful revolution,” the toppling of the socialist dictatorship in the Fall of 1989 by a large collection of grass-roots political opposition movements. Over the course of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) short history, the physical and symbolic space the Protestant Church occupied evolved from one dedicated primarily to the religious – defined as “pastoral care” (Seelsorge) – to one that functioned as the unifying umbrella organization under which a myriad of politically active associations and individuals hostile to the government gathered, discussed, organized and implemented various strategies of civil disobedience. The liminal legal space the Protestant Church eked out at the dawn of German state-sponsored communism was expanded by politically disenchanted citizens who had often been ferociously discriminated against,¹ and who managed to corrode the power base of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unification Party of Germany, SED) to such an extent that by the 1980s the (illegal) opposition proved overwhelming for the government and its security apparatus.

This paper surveys some of the representative events in the history of East German church-state relations that took place from the inception to the collapse of the GDR, spanning the years 1946² to 1989. The events examined, specifically the introduction of the universal draft, serve to shed light on why Protestant ecclesiastical institutions came to transcend the
(Lutheran inspired) secular-space versus religious-space dichotomy by becoming the locus of the political resistance movement. Arguably, this semiotic spatial dichotomy (if it ever existed) had already been transcended under Nazism when a group of theologians and Christian activists reacted against the apolitical character of the then Union of German Evangelical Churches (Deutsche Evangelische Kirche) by splitting off and forming the “Confessional Church” (Bekennende Kirche, BK), which engaged in critiques of fascist policies during the Third Reich. Ironically, the degree to which political activism was supported by and localized in the East German Church, however, suggests that the social role of religion in the GDR represents, quite contrary to the intentions of the SED-leadership, a radical step towards de-secularization. Despite repeated attempts by the SED to conceptualize the space of the Church as one of “simply” (i.e., apolitical) religion, the religious continued to transgress the state’s ideological boarders. Under SED-rule, the Protestant Church became a politically self-conscious entity that lobbied, outside the sanctioned domain of the religious, for the civil rights of citizens in the GDR.

The GDR was officially an atheist state based on the principles of Stalinist socialism. It might seem reasonable to predict, therefore, that the public role of religion in East Germany would have suffered a similar fate to that in the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, unlike under Stalin’s USSR, the SED not only allowed churches to remain active within the GDR’s boarders, but the party was seemingly unable to pass effective policies that quelled the growing political power of the Church. The party’s policies, aimed simultaneously at instrumentalizing and marginalizing the Church leaders and their congregations, were themselves largely responsible for creating an oppositional movement too powerful to parry.

That the Church was a formidable social institution not easily done away with in the years of German communism is in large part due to the aftermath of World War II, which laid the foundation for the entire history of GDR-church relations. After Germany’s capitulation in 1945, the Church was the only extant, functioning, pan-German institution, and (perhaps the only) one which could still lay claim to a degree, albeit compromised, of moral legitimacy. Although the Union of German Evangelical Churches had remained mostly silent on the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, the ecclesiastical bodies were seen by the occupying powers as the core of anti-fascist resistance, even though, as Ehrhart Neubert points out, very few church members actually fit this
The communicative infrastructure over which German churches reigned was consolidated in 1948 when both East and West German Protestant churches formed a new united organization, the Evangelical Church of Germany (Evangelische Kirchengemeinde in Deutschland, EVK). With the backing of West German churches through the EVK, East German church authorities could take vocal stances on social issues. As a result of both the relatively intact social and communicative infrastructure and the reputable standing among the Allied Forces, churches in early post-War Germany assumed a central role in the reconstruction effort, becoming an invaluable administrative partner and mediator for the occupying powers and for the defeated Germans alike. By the time the “Ulbricht group,” with the support of the Red Army declared the Soviet Occupied Territories to be a new socialist republic, on 7 October 1949, churches had already established themselves as an integral socio-political component of the newly emerging Germanys.

The entrenchment of Protestant ecclesiastical institutions in post-War Germany only partially accounts for the Church’s tenacious ability to remain active for the entire duration of the GDR’s existence in the hostile climate of state sponsored atheism. The SED’s policies towards religion were also responsible for the Church’s success. The “Ulbricht group” received orders directly from Moscow not to hinder Church activity and, indeed, to “draw them [the Church] into the reconstruction effort.” A policy of manipulation of ecclesiastical institutions for the ends of the state followed, whereby the SED attempted to use the social and political influence of the Church to support and legitimate the state’s goals. A precursor of this strategy, which would come to characterize most of the forty year history of the Church under East German socialist rule, could be witnessed during the 1946 regional elections (Landtagswahlen) in which the SED, trying to wrestle votes away from the Christian Democratic Union, relentlessly lobbied church members and Christian socialists for their political support, promising religious tolerance in return.

The relatively intact social networks and communicative infrastructure over which the Church reigned after WWII, and the importance of these in the post-war reconstruction effort, the moral and political clout it possessed, as well as the SED’s desire to appropriate religious organizations to shape the political future of East Germany, secured a limited amount of physical and intellectual space within which the Church and other ecclesiastical institutions could legally operate. This space was
codified in the GDR’s first constitution, drafted in 1949, in which the Church was termed the “embodiment of public rights.” In section V of the 1949 constitution, entitled “Religion and Religious Institutions,” article 41.1 guaranteed the freedom of religious belief and practice for every citizen. Legal clauses providing the East German Protestant Church its right to exist were reiterated, although in a more ambiguous formulation, in the revised 1968 constitution. The ostensibly harmless gap in the ideologically anti-religious armature of the SED dictatorship that the churches came to occupy, marked the beginning of the one-party system’s own demise. Often unnoticed by the SED-leadership, the religious space consecrated to ceremonial acts of devotion grew ever more radical in its willingness to take on social causes that were not being addressed by the party. When reinforced by the economic and geo-political changes of the coming decades, beginning with the Helsinki Accords of 1975, this religious space became the arena in which communist East Germany fought and eventually lost the Cold War.

Despite the apparently clearly-defined political positions of the Church and state in the GDR, the narrative of religion in East Germany is rife with contradictions. It is problematic to depict the “Protestant Church” as if it had acted historically as a unified, coherent organization. Although the EKD, which existed in both parts of the divided country until 1969 and was replaced in the GDR by the Union of Protestant Churches of East Germany (Bund der Evangelische Kirche-DDR, BEK-GDR), was the official mouth piece of the faithful, there were often irreconcilable ideological differences internal to these institutions that pitted congregation members, vicars and pastors, against church leaders who sat on the synods and church councils such as the Conference of Church Leaders (Konferenz der Kirchenleitung, KKL). Similarly, it is tempting to frame the Church, despite diverse opinions, as having had an anti-state agenda aimed at overthrowing the SED. Instead, the dominant (sanctioned) discourse sought to define a third-way, a “church in socialism,” whereby the GDR under the SED would be reformed, not destroyed.

It is equally oversimplified to characterize the history of the SED’s relationship to the Church and to individual believers as one of simply oppression. The SED pursued various public campaigns of appeasement and reconciliation, while unofficially attempting to utilize the Church leadership for its own propagandistic ends, endeavoring to marginalize and discredit those who would not conform to the approved line. For example, as the celebration in 1983 of Martin Luther Year attests, the
SED’s official policies towards the role of religion in the state occasionally showed signs of tacit acceptance. However, although some church leaders, such as the head of the Union of Protestant Churches of East Germany, Bishop Albrecht Schönherr, tried to reconcile themselves with the restrictive policies of the SED, and even though there were instances when the party’s persecution of believers was less severe, the ideological boarders that separated the Church and state are clear. The SED viewed the Church, as one party member put it, as “the most powerful legal oppositional imperialist force” in the GDR. Paul Verner of the SED’s central committee (Zentralkomitee), explained that it was the government’s responsibility to re-educate and thereby liberate religious believers from the mire of their superstition. Church members tended to regard the state’s attempted implementation, through discriminatory and repressive policies, of what was termed a “primitive atheism” as the most serious threat of its time.

Several events in the forty years of GDR history were formative in shaping the trajectory of the resistance movement, which took the shape it did largely by reacting to the ever-encroaching restrictive policies of the party. Among these could be listed: the worker uprising on 17 June 1953; the introduction in 1955 of the “youth betrothal” (Jugendweihe), which were oaths of allegiance to the SED-leadership meant to replace communism; the building of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961; the forced creation of the East German Union of Protestant Churches-GDR in 1969; the public suicide of the Reverend Brüsewitz in 1976; and the introduction of paramilitary training for all school children in 1978.

The resistance movement tended to coalesce around two central issues, education and peace. Although education and peace as unifying themes were responses to specific SED policies such as paramilitary training in schools, more importantly they were strategies to voice general political critiques in a state where a legally organized opposition was virtually impossible. Although many dissenters were practicing Christians and even though the Church was the physical space that housed the opposition movement, the decidedly non-religious quality of the issues that the Church made its own including, for example, the de-escalation of the arms race and environmentalism, had several important consequences.

Laying claim to the only relatively free political space in the GDR and willing to take political stances, the Church managed to attract many people who would not otherwise have been active members of a congregation, including Marxists critical of the SED-dictatorship and other political
dissidents, disenfranchised and rebellious youths, and non-religious pacifists. Also, the moral hue of the issues that mobilized congregations legitimated their political opposition beyond the confines of a theological discourse. In effect, the traditional (West European) secularist distinction between religion and politics was completely eradicated. “To speak of Jesus” as one church member described his activism, “is to make politics.” Under the guise of doing a-political religious work in a religiously sanctioned space activists and dissidents were able to pursue their politically subversive ends. This constellation of factors, which grew out of the centrality of the Church in post-war Germany, and which took shape in the 1960s, grew in force throughout the 1970s to become an explosive revolutionary power uncontrollable by the SED in the 1980s.

The introduction of the universal draft, which was one step towards the SED’s aim of militarizing the general population, provides a pertinent example of how the Church, often despite the efforts of accommodating leaders, was forced into a political position by short-sighted social policies of the government. After the SED officially closed the un-patrollable borderer between East and West Berlin by building the euphemistically named “anti-fascist protection Wall,” it no longer needed to concern itself with the threat of a mass-exodus if unpopular policies were introduced. In the years 1949 to 1953 alone, 800 000 people fled from the GDR. Emigration, especially of well-educated young East Germans, was the most problematic trend confronting the fledgling state.

One of the first policies the SED passed after building the Wall was a mandatory two-year military service for which, unlike in West Germany, there was no alternative for conscientious objectors. As of January 1962, every man over the age of eighteen was forced to serve in the army. The draft issue presented an arena in which a theology inspired by prominent Protestant thinkers like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the central theorists for the Church-based resistance movement, could be actualized and implemented through small practical steps. The Church found support for their protests against a mandatory armed service in large sections of the populace, who still had clear memories of the consequences of the Second World War. During the 1960s the Church became a representative organization for those who refused to serve their military terms. The fierce lobbying of church groups, coupled with the political embarrassment that those who refused to serve represented, led to a success of sorts for the activists. The SED created the “construction soldier” alternative, a unit of weaponless soldiers who were nonetheless used for
the building of military infrastructure.

The introduction of mandatory military service and the formation of the construction soldier alternative are quintessential examples of failed SED policies with regards to the Church as political actor and the repression of an anti-communist opposition. Construction soldiers, often members of Protestant congregations, were brought together by the government in their rejection of armed service. They represented the most important human resource from which the political opposition movement of the 1970s and 1980s drew. Bernd Eisenfeld, for example, who was one of the first construction soldiers to serve his term, was an active church member and critic who was involved in the protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact soldiers on 20 August 1968; he was sentenced to a long prison term as a result. In 1975 he was shipped off to West Germany and became one of the most important chroniclers of the resistance to the draft in the GDR.

Prison and deportation were only some of the measures used by the SED to counter political dissent. Other tactics often resorted to by the government included revoking work permits or preventing suspected activists from entering or retaining a job (Arbeitsverbot), preventing suspects from entering university or receiving other forms of higher education, and espionage. “Suspected dissidents” were as a rule not formally charged. Choosing to object to military service, or making other explicit declarations of dissent, therefore, entailed drastic ramifications. Young men who avoided the draft, even though they were still drawn into the military apparatus as construction soldiers, were almost exclusively barred from receiving a university education and secure work.

By allowing the Church to become intimately involved in the issue of the military service, by not quickly creating an alternative, and by discriminating so decisively against those who did not want to serve with a gun, the SED effectively created political dissident camps, where resisters met other like-minded young people, formed networks, and exchanged ideas. At the centre of this movement of emerging rebels was the Church, to whom those young people not wanting to be drafted could go for counseling and administrative support. By 1977, more than 10 000 men chose not to serve in the regular military, and it was usually at the behest of individual clergy members that they became construction soldiers.

The pattern of bringing those dissatisfied with official policies together into the relatively free political space of the Church was repeated...
with every issue on which the clergy and congregations took a stand. The combination of tenacious activism and social resistance by the various grass-roots movements and the seeming inability of the SED leadership to recognize that a unified opposition was being created by the lack of any legal alternative meant that by the late 1970s the situation had already become uncontrollable, and even the wave of arrests and deportations that took place from 1983 to 1986 could barely make a dent. The SED had certainly managed to install accommodating leaders in the Church administration, among them the already-mentioned Bishop Schönheir who in 1978 had a much publicized conversation with Chancellor Erich Honecker about the role of religion in the GDR. In their conversation, Honecker promised to ease the restrictions on church activity. The congregations and others who formed the grass-roots resistance movement were, however, no longer listening to gestures of appeasement made by the Church functionaries or the vacuous promises of the SED administration. Rather, elements within the Church were on a head-on confrontational course with the government. Consider theologian Heino Faleke or Bishop Fränkel – by 1972 two of the most important figures in the Church-based opposition movement – who were making a much bigger impact on the grass-roots by addressing issues of free speech and human rights.

The question of de-escalating the arms race was another example that illustrates the pattern of how the SED systematically, if inadvertently, funneled political resisters within the GDR into the growing oppositional space of the Church, the infrastructure of which was then utilized by these activists to mobilize even larger sections of the population. The general dissatisfaction with the official stance on arms development was in part responsible for a systematic dialogue between disenfranchised Marxists and the church-based resistance movement that began in the 1970s. The Church-Marxist dialogue was most active in Leipzig, a university city where the mass-uprising of 1989 began. The fact that Ernst Bloch was another important intellectual influence in the church-based resistance movement attests to the fact that activists, regardless of their worldview, were crossing the ideological lines between orthodox theology and classical Marxism and uniting in their opposition to the socialist dictatorship of the SED.

Had there been a legal political opposition in the GDR, ideologically opposed factions such as atheist Marxists and Protestant theologians may not have joined together to form a united front. However, by the early
1980s, the church-based resistance movement incorporated almost all opponents of the SED. Organizations such as “Women for Peace,” “Democracy Now,” or “New Forum” were united in the Church under the banners of the “peace-movement” and the “environmental-movement.” When the geo-political climate changed in the early-1980s, the virtually-unified opposition mobilized its members and systematically undermined the SED administration through various public acts of solidarity for political prisoners, mass-demonstrations, publication and distribution of illegal newsletters, and education and counseling campaigns. The Helsinki Accords, which Chancellor Honecker promised would allow people to move freely between East and West Germany, would contribute to reuniting families and grant freedom of the press, were instrumental in providing a legal basis upon which the activists could establish their protests.

Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika brought about immense social and economic strain on the GDR. The internal political opposition, which by 1987 had become encouraged by the more progressive policies in the Soviet Union and emboldened by their own numbers, revealed itself as too great a force for the Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Saatsicherheit, MfS) to counter. At the Zion Church in Berlin, for example, attendants of the weekly political meetings became ever more vocal about their demands, which centered mostly on the relaxation of travel restrictions, the liberalization of the press, and a transparent election process. On 7 May 1989, church-based activists organized to unofficially supervise the federal election and were for the first time able to demonstrate conclusively that the election results of 98.85% in favour of the SED leadership had been a fabrication. The wide-spread recognition that the elections had been falsified resulted in both spontaneous and organized protests. Most important were the Monday meetings at the Nikolai Church in Leipzig which grew weekly. When the border to Hungary was opened on the 27 June 1989, 15,000 people fled the GDR in the three days. Together with the ever growing demonstrations that spilled out from the churches, the Brandenburg Gate was surprisingly opened on 10 November 1989. The SED dictatorship had been effectively toppled.

After the fall of the SED, the church-based resistance movement virtually disappeared. Integrated into the democratic system, the once-allied factions of Marxists, theologians and adherents of various youth subcultures did not manage to continue to speak with a unified political voice. The role of the East German Protestant Church itself receded from
the political realm and reverted back to a more secular conceived notion of the religious as not political.

Endnotes

1. Although many sensitive records documenting the SED’s political repression were destroyed after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Ehrarht Neubert suggests that there were more than 200,000 political prisoners in the GDR. Ehrarht Neubert, *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1997), 28.

2. The GDR was officially founded on 7 October 1949. However, the territories which eventually became the East German state were those under the control of the Soviet Union’s Red Army since the capitulation of the NAZI government in 1945. As such, the years before the official begin of the GDR are as important as the subsequent years for understanding the history of East German Church-state relations.


4. Ruth M. Ediger, “History of an Institution as a Factor for Predicting Church Institutional Behavior: The Cases of the Catholic Church in Poland, the Orthodox Church in Romania, and the Protestant Churches in East Germany,” *East European Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2005): 314.


27. Ediger, “History of an Institution as a Factor for Predicting Church Institutional Behavior,” 313.


